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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintifc-Respondent,
Case No.
14591

-vsSTEVEN CRAIG TURNER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from the judgment of the
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which
found him guilty by a jury trial of violation of Utah
Code Ann.

§

76-6-302 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

On April 14 and 15, 1976, appellant was tried
and convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of
Utah Code Ann.
s~nt~nrcd

§

76-6-302

(1953), as amended.

He was

to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate

term of five years to life in prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent petitions the Court to affirm

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
the> conviction of Machine-generated
appellantOCR,
bymayacontain
jury
errors.in the lower court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 22, 1975, Jerry Graham was robbed at
Dan's Foodtown at 70th South and Highland Drive, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

On July 22, 1975, appellant

was arrested in connection with the robbery, identified
by Mr. Graham as the assailant and on July 23, 1975,
a complaint was filed accusing the appellant of
aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann.
76-6-302 (1953), as amended in 1975.
was held on April 14 and 15, 1976.

§

Trial by jury
After presentation

of all the evidence, the following six instructions,
among others, were given to the jury:
"Instruction No. 8: Under the
law of the State of Utah, robbery is
the unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property in the possession of
another from his or her person, or
immediate presence, against the will
of that person, which taking is
accomplished by means of force or
fear.
A person commits an aggravated
robbery, which is a first degree felony,
if, in the course of committing a
robbery, that person uses a deadly .
weapon.
A deadly weapon means anyth1ng
that in the manner of its use or
intended use is likely to cause dea~h
or serious bodily injury.

-2-
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Under the law, an act of using
a deadly weapon is deemed to be 'in the
course of committing a robbery,' as
that phrase is used in these instructions,
if the use of a deadly weapon occurs in an
attempt to commit, or during the cowmission
of a robbery.
One acts 'unlawfully' in the taking
of personal property in the possession of
another, as used in these instructions
if the actor takes such property wrongfully, without rights or permission and
with the deliberate intent to commit a
crime.
Under the law, one acts intentionally
or with intent with respect to the nature
of his conduct or as a result of his conduct
when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or to cause the
result.
Intent with which an act is done
denotes a state of mind and connotes
purpose in so acting.
Intent, being a
state of mind, is not always susceptible
of proof by direct and positive evidence and
may ordinarily be inferred from acts,
conduct, statements and circumstances."
"Instruction No. 9: You are instructed
that a firearm is not a deadly weapon unless
it is loaded. The Utah Code defines when
a weapon is deemed to have been loaded in
76-10-502, but if from the evidence you have
a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
gun testified to in this case was loaded,
you must find the defendant not guilty of
aggravated robbery and consider the lesser
included offense of robbery."
"Instruction No. 10: You are instructed
that for the purposes of this case, that a
'dangerous weapon' means any item that in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the manner of its use or intended
use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury.
In construing
whether an item, object or thin3 not
commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon, the character
of the instrument, object or thing;
the character of the wound produced, if
any; and the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used shall be
determinative.
1
Firearms 1 means pistols, revolvers,
sawed-off rifle and/or any device that
could be used as a weapon from which
is expelled a projective by any force."
"Instruction No. 11:
You are
instructed that facsimile is defined as:
An exact and precise copy of anything.
An exact reproduction, for example, the
signature reproduced by rubber stamp."
"Instruction No. 12:
You are further
instructed that a facsimile of a firearm
is any instrument that by its appearance
resembles a firearm."
"Instruction No. 13:
Before you can
convict the defendant of the crime of
aggravated robbery, as charged in the
Information, you must find from the evidencbeyond a reasonabllC doubt, all of the fol!J.
elements of that crime:
1. That on or about the 22nd day of
July, 1975, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the defendant, Steven Craig Turner,
unlawfully and intentionally took money or
property from Jerry Graham.
2.
That said property or money was
in the possession or immecliaLP presence
of Jerry Graham.
3.
That the takinq of saicl money or_
property from Je-rry Grahum \vZlS accomplishc'
by means of force or four.
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4. That in the course of taking
said money or property the defendant,
Steven Craig Turner, used a deadly
weapon consisting of a firearm or
a facsimile of a firearm.
If you belive that the evidence
establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to
convict the defendant. On the other
hand, if the evidence has failed to so
establish one or more of said elements
then you should find the defendant not
guilty of aggravated robbery and then
consider the lesser included offense
of robbery in accordance with the
following instruction."
Closing arguments were then heard and the jury
began its deliberation.

After the jury had left the

courtroom time was granted by the bench to except to the
instructions.

The State indicated it had no objections.

Appellant objected to the above recited instructions (T.l23124) on the grounds that the instructions were confusing and
conflicting and further objected to the statute as being
unconstitutionally vague.
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN.

§

76-6-302 (1953), AS AMENDED IN

1975, IS NOT UNCO::STITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO
APPELLANT IN THIS CASE.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-302

{1953), as amended,

insofar as is pertinent to the case at bar, reads as
follows:
"(1} A person commits aggravated
robbery if in the course of committing
robbery he:
{a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile
of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon."
The complaint under which appellant was

charg~

and convicted reads:
"That the said Steven Craig Turner
at the time and place aforesaid, robbed
Jerry Graham, and in so doing, used a
deadly weapon, to wit:
a gun or facsirnile
thereof." {R.8).
Appellant contends that the court,

in attemptinc

to instruct th"' jury on the meaning of the word "facsimile,
did so in a manner as to render Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-302

{1953), as amended, unconstitutionally vague as applied tc

appellant in this case.

The Utah Supreme Court has spoker

on more than one occasion to the matter of unconstitutiona~
vagueness of statutory law.

1\s has been the case for man)'

years in Utah, there is a very strong presumption in favo!
of the validity of leg isla tivc enactments, ancl where possi'
the Supreme Court must uphold the validity of an act rathi
than declare it unconstitutionill.
Co., et al., 119 Utah 274,

226 P.2cl 127

{1950); Grc~
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v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (1974).

The feeling of the court

has been that only where it is impossible to resolve
doubts will an act be declared invalid for uncertainty
or vagueness.

Tygreen, supra; Nowers v. Oakden, 110 Utah

25, 169 P.2d lOB

(1946).

The test for uncertainty or

vagueness was enunciated succinctly in State v. Packard,
122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).

The Court, in declaring

the criminal statute involved unconstitutional, set forth
guidelines to be followed:
"Concerning the question of
uncertainty or vagueness of statutes,
the authorities seem to be in accord
that the test a statute must meet to
be valid is:
It must be sufficiently
definite (a) to inform persons of
ordinary intelligence, who would be
law abiding, what their conduct must
be to conform to its requirements;
(b) to advise a defendant accused of
violating it just what constitutes
the offense with which he is charged,
and (c) to be susceptible of uniform
interpretation and application by those
charged with responsibility of applying
and enforcing it."
This test was adhered to and reaffirmed in Greaves v.

In the case at bar, appellant seemingly is not
challenging the validity of Section 76-6-302, per se, but
is challenging the statute as applied to him in his trial
after thE' trial judye, via jury instructions, defined the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
LibraryLc."
Services and
Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah
State Library.
word "L>csiml
It
should
be noted
that
appellant did
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not offer an alternative definition to the one given
by the court in Instuction 11.

The Court, in defining

"facsimile" in Instruction 11, apparently consulted
Ballentine's Law Dictionary for reference, since as
appellant states, there is very little in the way of
legal dissertation on the precise meaning of the word
per se,

in a legal sense.

however, for it

~ould

This is understandable,

seem that the word "facsimile,"

speaking in a legal sense, is a non-technical rather

t~n

a technical word, and as such, there would be little
occasion for legal interpretation.

However, since the

word appears in not only the challenged statute, but in tf
complaint, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury
as to the meanin; to be given such a "non-technical" word
used in a ''technical"

(legal) sense.

done so could have resulted in error.

Failure to ha?e
McBride v. Woods,

124 Colo. 384, 391, 238 P.2d 183 (1951); Luca~~~~~
C.R. Co., 98 Mich. 1, 56 N.W. 1039 (1893).
The word facsimile appears in Ball~n~~nc's
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, as follows:
"Facsimile.

An exact and precise
An exact reprocluctlon,
for example, the signature reproduced by
rubber stamp." 11 Am.Jur.2cl B. & \v. §

CO?Y of anything.

210.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
-8-errors.

This definition coincides verbatim with that
given in Instruction No. 11.
In his brief, appellant gives us the benefit of
other definitions and synonyms of the word in question.
Websters New Unabridged Dictionary, Section Edition,
gives the following definition:
"1. Act of making a copy,
imitation.
2. An exact and detailed
copy of anything, as of a book,
document, painting, or statute.
Syn. See duplicate." (Emphasis
added.)
Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
Language gives the following definition of "facsimile:"
"An exact copy or reproduction:
a perfect imitation of a work of art,
manuscript, engraving, coin, stamp,
medal or other original: in a loose
sense, an exact model or counterpart.
Syn.: see Duplicate: model."
Case law produces a definition for the word
"imitation" in the case of People v. Delgardo, 146 N.Y.S.2d
350, 356; 1 Misc.2d 821

(1955):

"The word 'imitation' when applied
to pistols and revolvers means so nearly
resembling the genuine as to mislead,
with the ae2arent object of produ:in~,
~nd likely_~roduce~on the mJ.nds of
those against whom it is to be used, the
belief that the imitation weapon is capable
of producinq all the injurious consequences
to the victim as the use of the genuJ.ne
~rticlc itself."
(Emphasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Now that an "arsenal" of definitions of the
word "facsimile" has been established, both in a nonlegal (Websters; Funk and Wagnalls) and legal sense
(Ballentine's, Black), what is the meaning of "facsimile"·
What did the legislature have in mind \vhen enacting
Section 76-6-302, specifically using the phrase "
(a) uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm.
(Emphasis added.)

o

"?

Certainly any of the definitions

mentioned, including the one given by the trial judge

in Instruction No. 11, would suffice.

The test to use

in the interpretation of a word or phrase in a statute
has been set forth b; the Utah Supreme Court in
State v.

Packar~,

supra, at 375:

"The limitations of language are
such that neither absolute exactitude of
expression nor complete precision of
meaning are to be expected, and such
standard cannot be required.
On the
other hand there is no disagreement
among the courts that where a rule is
set up, the violation of which subjects
one to criminal punishment, the
restrictions upon conduct shou 1 ,j be
described with sufficient certainty,
so that persons of ordin,1ry intcllic;ence,
desiring to obey the law, ~~y knnw how
to govern themselves in conforr:1i t'y' v.'ith i~~
and that no one shoulcl be comi''•llcJ ul
the peril of life, lilwrt;• or pn'!'''rty,
to speculate as to the rnc'lni"'J of pcnul
statutes 0"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This test was reiterated by the Supreme Court
of Utah once again in Greaves v. State, supra at 807.
Speaking to a

co~plaint

that the criminal statute

involved was void for vagueness, the court said:
" . . . the presumption of validity
hereinabcvestated,gives rise to the
rule that a statute will not be declared
unconstitutional for that reason (vagueness) if under any sensible interpretation
of its language it can be given practical
effect. The requirement is that it must
be sufficiently clear and definite to
inform persons of ordinary intelligence
what their conduct must be to conform to
its requirements and to advise one accused
of violating it what constitutes the offense
with which he is charged."
(Emphasis
added.)
In the Greaves case, supra at 806, the Court also
laid down the test to be used in the judicial determination
of the constitutionality of statutes:
"In regard to the judicial
determination of the constitutionality
of statutes there are certain principles
relating to statutory construction, to
be taken into consideration. Because
the duty rests upon the court to determine
the scope of the powers of all three
branches of government, they have a
special responsibility to exercise a high
degree of caution and restraint to keep
themselves within the limitations of the
ju~icial power in order not to infringe
upon the prerogatives of the executive
or the legislative branches. In harmony
with that policy it is the well-established
rule that legislative enactments are
endo~Jed with a strong presumption of
validity; and that they should not be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

declared unconstitutional if there
is any reasonable basis upon which they
can be found to come within the
constititutional framework; and that
a statute will not be stricken down
as being unconstitutional unless it
appears to be so beyond a reasonable
doubt."
(Emphasis added.)
There are several questions to be answered in
determining as tc whether this "reasonable doubt test"
and the test enunciated in State v. Packard, supra, have
been met.

Is there really a reasonable doubt in the

mi~!

of men of ordinary intelligence as to what the legislaturE
meant when it enacted a law (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1953), as amended in 1975) prohibiting the use of a "fin·

arm or a facsimile of a firearm" in the commission of a
robbery?

Was there a reasonble doubt in appellant's mind,

when he committed this robbery, as to what conduct was
prohibited by the statute?

Was there really

a reasonablE

doubt in the minds of the jury members as to what the
meaning of the wcrd "facsimile" and the phrase "facsimile
of a firearm" meant?

Respondent respectfully sbu~1its that

the answers to the questions propounded are succinctly in
the negative.
It would seem after careful

r~adina

various definitions of "facsimile," and after

of the
rc~ding

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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People v. Delgardo,

su~,

that the word "facsimile" is

synonymous with "imitation," "duplicate," "resemblance,"
etc., and that this is what the legislature had in mind
when enacting the statute, as did the court when giving
Instruction Nos. ll and 12.

It would also seem appropriate

to conclude that appellant was put on fair notice that if
he committed a robbery by use of an actual firearm or
something that resembled or was the imitation of a firearm
he would have to answer to the people of the State of Utah
for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended
in 1975.
Apparently appellant would have this Court take
the view that "facsimile of a firearm" be construed through
the eyes of the criminal, rather than through the eyes of the
victim or the eyes of the jury.

As was so adequately expressed

in People v. Delgardo, supra, the purpose of the use of an
"imitation" or "facsimile of a pistol" is "

to produce,

upon the minds of those against whom it is to be used, the
b~lief

that the imitation weapon is capable of producing

all the injurious consequences to the victim as the use of the
CJlnuinC' article> itself."
lc·JiSlc~turc

Certainly this is the thought the

had in minc1 when drafting Section 76-6-302.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Certainly the evidence in the case at bar bears out the
fact that the victim believed the appellant to have
been armed with a pistol, whether or not the object
was in fact a pistol (T.lO and T. 22).

"Q. Now, you indicated
you saw about an inch and a
half of a gun pointing out of a
shirt, is that what you stated?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Would you explain to me
what you mean pointing out of his
shirt?
A.
He had his hand under the
barrell, was just up under his shirt.
All I could see of the shirt down over
it was an inch and a half of the
barrell.
Q. Sure it wasn't a piece of
pipe?
A.
I don't believe it to be, no."
Clearly 1t can be seen that the victim believed
the object pointing out of appellant's shirt to be a
of some sort.

~n

Whether or not it was actually a gun or

not is immaterial.

The important criteria, according

to the statute, is that the object must have in fact beer.firearm (pistol) or so closely resemble a firearm (facsi~!-.
of a pistol) as to induce belief on behalf of the victim

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that the object was in fact a firearm.

This does

not seem as complicated as appellant would have
this Court believe. If appellant's theory is
followed, those persons such as appellant who
desire to participate in activity such as
robbery will now be able to reap the lucrative
fruits of an aggravated robbery while only
being required to pay the price of a simple
lesser included offense of robbery, by the
use of something which, though it resembled
a firearm, was not the precise, exact, dimension
by dimension replica of the firearm appellant had
in mind.

Certainly this is not the thinking

behind the statute, and certainly such an
interpretation could not and was not given to
Instructions 11 and 12, either individually or
collectively.

-15-
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Instruction 11, when read with Instruction 12,
does not open up a "vast area of definition and interprc·
tation," but merely gives the jury the definition to
be followed while exercising its function,

i.e., to

determine whether or not the object used in the robbery,
based upon the evidence given, was in fact a firearm
or a facsimile thereof.

If in fact the jury found

appellant guilty of aggravated robbery on the theory
that a facsimile of a firearm was used, the jury was
required to find as fact that the instrument used so
exactly and precisely resembled a firearm so as to
actually be

mista~en

essence what

This is in

for such a weapon.

Inst~uctions

11 and 12, when read together,

mean.
Appellant's contention that Instructions 12
and 9, when read together, compound the vagueness of the
statute is wholly without foundation.
ination of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-302

A co.reful exam(1953),

as amended

in 1975, reveals that there are several modes by which
aggravated robber/ co.n be committed.

One is by usc of

a firearm, another by use of a facsimile or o.n imitation
of a firearm.

Thee complaint

charyr·~;

that~

committed by the '.JSe of a dco.dly weapon,

the crin:c
to v;it:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or facsimile thereof.

Instruction 9 sets out the

requirements to be met in order for a gun to be classified as a deadly weapon, should the jury find that as a
matter of fact that a real gun was used.

Instruction 12

sets forth the definition of a "facsimile of a firearm",
whlch instruction of course would be used should the jury
find that a real gun was not used.

Thus, Instructions

9 and 12 are absolutely necessary in order for the jury
to make a finding based on the evidence set forth and
the statute under which appellant was charged.

No

conflict or vagueness exists; if anything, a marvelous
job of clarification.
Appellant concludes his argument in Point I
of his brief by submitting that the object used could
have been "a three-inch piece of rubber tubing painted
grey, grey

~lastic

tubing or any number of things that

are neither deadly or dangerous and still appellant
could have been convicted of aggravated robbery."

According

to the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as
amenclecl in 1975, if "three-inch rubber tubing painted
<Jrey", or "<Jr<:'Y plastic tubing" was so designed as to give
on•-', i'dr·ticL•lc<rly Hr.

Jerr~·

Graham, the victim, the

bc·l it·f ur fear that an actual gun was being directed
at hillt, ilnd it the jury found as a matter of fact that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-17-

such tubing so closely resembled an actual firearm
as to give the very appearance of one, then appellant
could have been convicted of aggravated robhery, and
rightly so.

On the other hand, the jury may have

found that a real firearm was used, and that it was
loaded.

If so, appellant could have been convicted of

aggravated robbery, and rightly so.

In either case,

Instructions 9, 11, and 12 were all very necessary for
the jury deliberation.

The jury had many decisions

to make, among which were to find as a matter of fact
whether or not the object used was a firearm, whether
or not it was loaded if it was a firearm, if the object
was not a firearc,

jid it so closely resemble a firearm

by its exactr,c,ss CJucl resemblance so as to give the victim
the appearance of being an actual firearm.

These matters

are all within the province of the jury, and as such the
jury must be instructed thereon.

People v. McKinney,

111 Cal. App. 2d 690,

(1952); State v.

245 P.2cl 24

Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. 279, 499 P.2d 81
v. People, 156 Colo.

334,

398 P.2cl 973

(1972); Hutton
(1965); §tate

v. Faulkner, 5 N.C. App. 113, 168 S.E.2cl 9 (l9G9).
of the above cases dealt

Each

with the issue of wlwt:hc:r or

not it was the fu,-,ction of the jury to clctormilw ,,:hether
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or not an object used was an actual firearm or an
imitation, whether or not such firearm, if real, was
loaded, and whether or not the object used was a
dangerous or deadly weapon within the confines of the
statutes involved.
Respondent submits that the Instructions given
by the trial court did not change the meaning of the
statute so as to leave it vague or uncertain, but
merely explained the various elements of the offense
with which appellant was charged and further defined
certain "technical" (legally speaking) words which were
necessary to arrive at a just verdict, based upon the
evidence presented.

Specifically, Instruction 11

defined ''facsimile" as taken from a reliable legal
source; the term "facsimile" was used in Instruction
12, thus the need for Instruction 11.

Based upon

Instruction 11, Instruction 12 could read:

"You are

further instructed that an exact or precise copy, or
imitation of a firearm is any instrument that by its
appearance resembles a firearm."

Thus the need for

both instructions - they compliment one another.

They

mu,;t l;c reL!d toqcther and taken as a whole, as was
cx~rcsscd

345 ill

by this court in State v. Guerts, 11 Utah 2d

352,

359 P.2cl 12

(1961):
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"This also ca~be said, adroit
counsel may dis$ent an instruction,
and by attempting to hang the whole
case on separate parts thereof, nake
a plausible argument that error was
cownitted.
But when the instructions
are considered as a whole, and in light
of the evidence and the particular
cha~ges lodged against the defendant,
as they should be, there is no do~bt
that the jury was clearly and
accurately advised of specific charges.

"
Such is the case at bar.

Appellant has in

reality attempted to "dissent" each instruction separatel:
concluding that there are contradictions therein, while
at the same time proceeding under the guise of argument
that the Instructions, when read together, are such as

to render the statute vague.

When read together, the

Instructions make clear the evidence needed in order fur
appellant to be convicted under Utah Code Ann.
(1953), as amended in 1975.

§

76-6-302

The statute is clear as to

the conduct prohibited, both to the citizen of ordinary
intelligence who desires to obey the law, and to the
citizen of ordinary intelligence who desires to
the law.

dlsob~

Proof of a reasonable doubt has not been sub-

mitted to show that the statute was vaque> as iJi·rdicd to
plaintiff.

Grea,:es v. State, sup_Y"C\·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

POINT II
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE DISTRICT COURT
ARE NOT CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY.
Appellant alleges conflict between Instructions
8 and 10 in that Instruction 8 defines a "deadly weapon"

in terms of its likelihood of causing death or serious
bodily injury, while Instruction 10 defines a "dangerous
weapon" in terms of its capability of causing death
or serious bodily injury.

Two points should be noted:

(l) a weapon which is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury could not fit into such a category if it
did not possess the capability of inflicting such a
serious degree of damage;

(2) appellant submitted

Instruction 10 for use by the court.

In so doing, he

cannot now complaint about the confusing use of his
Instruction.

People v. Darby, 114 Cal. App. 2d 412,

250 P.2d 743 (1952); State v. Stewart, 161 Mont. 501,
507 P.2c1 1050 (1973); State v. Miller, lll Utah 255,
117 P. 2cl 727 ( l9iJ 7).

In

~liller,

supra, the defendant,

in a prosecution for rape, requested an instruction
using lhc phrase "carnal knowledge".

He then complained

ubout the confus.inc:; usc of the phrase in the instruction
Tile court dismissccl this point of appeal with the

CJ i 'i<'n.

follcY.vitLJ comment:
appcll

:11:

l

1 <;

i

11

"

"Furthermore, we do not believe
position to complain

about the use of
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words, as it was at his invitation."
in State v. Stewart,

su~ra,

Such was the case

where the defendant offered

an instruction, which was accepted by the court and
given.

The defendant then claimed error in giving of

the instruction.

The court flatly dismissed such an

argument by simply declaring, "Prepared
No. 9 was given.

instructio~

Defendant cannot claim error when

one of his offered instructions is given".
the case at bar.

Such is

Appellant offered Instruction No.

10, and he cannot claim error because of an allegation
of conflict with Instruction 8.
there is no

Be that as it may,

conflict between the two instructions,

as logic infers in the earlier explanation.
Appellan~

further argues that Instructions

8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 are all conflicting and leave the
jury with at least five possible methods of convicting,
all contradictory.

Such is not the case when the

Instructions, which should be considered together, arc
considered as a whole.
267,,

258 P. 2d 453

(1951).

Instruction 8 sets forth

the elements necessary to prove in ordc•r to co•1vict
of robbery or aggravated rohl1:,r·1••

It spcrific·s UL't a

deadly weapon must be used to cnnvict of

aggravat~J

robbery and further defines v:hat a cl<>chllj •.-.··.·:q1.'" l'c>nois"
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of.

Instruction 9 sets forth the conditions under

which a firearm is to be considered a deadly weapon.
This instruction is necessary because the appellant
is charged in the complaint with using a firearm or
facsimile thereof in the commision of the robbery.
The statute under which he is charged also makes use
of the term "firearm".

There too, is evidence in

the case on which the jury could conclude that a genuine
firearm was used.

If so determined, they must face the

question as to whether or not the firearm was loaded,
thus deciding, within their province, whether or not the
firearm would be classified as a deadly weapon.

Thus

the need for Instruction 9.
Instruction 10 was offered by appellant, thus
no error can be claimed, despite the fact there is none
as alleged.
Instructions 11 and 12 are needed since appellant
is charged \vi th committing the robbery with a fire arm
or facsimile thereof.

The Instructions, as mentioned

previously, explain the definition of "facsimile of
a firearm."
Instruction 13 sets forth the elements of the
crime which must be proven before a conviction can be
found.

The final element, which is the subject of this
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appeal, states:
"4.
That in the course of
taking said money or property the
defendant, Steven Craig Turner,
used a deadly weapon consisting
of a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm."
This Instruction apprises the jury of the fact that
before they can find appellant guilty of aggravated
robbery, they must first find one of two things:

(l)

that Steven Craig Turner, the appellant, used a deadly

weapon consisting of a firearm (in which case, according
to Instruction 9, the firearm must be found to be
loaded); or (2) that Steven Craig Turner used a facsimile
of a firearm (thus the need for Instructions 11 and 12).
This is precisely what the statute prohibits, and is
precisely what the appellant is charged with.
It is true that the language in paragraph 2
of Instruction 8, in which it is said that one committing
robbery by the use of a deadly weapon commits aggravated
robbery, is narrower than that used in the statute;
for the statute precludes not only the usc of a deadly
weapon, but the usc of a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, a knife or facsimile of a knife.
Instructions 9, ll, and 12 cover the moanin,J o' fircurm
and facsimile of a firea1m.
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Thus, it can be seen that, when taken and read
together as a whole, the Instructions present to the jury,
a group of citizens of ordinary intelligence, the
necessary criteria and meaning to be given various terms
in their judging of the evidence.
needed.

Each instruction is

Each is legally sound, individually and collectively

They do not go beyond the evidence presented.

Nowhere

has appellant shown that a different result could have been
obtained had other instructions been given or those given
refused.

State v. Anderson, 100 Utah 468, 475, 116

P.2d 398 (1941).
The complaint charged appellant with committing
robbery by either using a deadly weapon consisting of
a firearm; or, committing robbery by using a facsimile
of a firearm.

Two different theories were charged.

There was sufficient evidence to support either theory,
and as such, the jury was entitled to instructions on
both theories as long as the evidence was supportive
and as long as the instructions clearly distinguished
both theories.
470 P.7cl 191

State v. Golladay_, 78 \•lash. 2d 121,

(1970).

The court stated in Golladay at

20 I :
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"Thus, a defendant may be charged
with committing a single crime in
two or more ways and proof of one
will uphold the indictment or infornation.
But before the jury
can be instructed on and allowed to
consider the various ways of corr~itting
the crime alleged, there must be
sufficient evidence to support the
instructions.
Moreover, the instructions must clearly distinguish
the alternative theories and require
the necessity for a unanimous verdict
on either of the alternatives. When
such is the case, the prosecutor need
not be forced to elect, for fear that
half of the jury will find the defendant
guilty on one theory and half on
another theory."
The State of Utah alleged that the appellant
committed robbery, and in so doing used a deadly 1,·eapon
consisting of a firearm, or, in the

alternative, used

a facsimile of a firearm, which would not be a deadly
weapon; however, Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-302

(1953), as

amended in 1975, does not require that a deadly weapon
be used in order for one to be convicted of aggravated
robbery.

The requirement is met if a facsimile of a

firearm is used.

The reguirenent is met if a genuine

firearm is used.

The complaint is clear in that it

alleges that eith2r a deac11y l,vcapon,
was used; or,

in thf: altcr~-1ative,

a

spc·ciiicc1lly o gun,
fac~~intil<._' of

a

deadly weapon, co:~sislinq, specificdlly, or,, farsinlil,c
of a gun.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-26-

Appellant was put on notice as to what conduct
I·: as

prohibited.

jury so found.

He chose to violate that conduct.

The

No error prejudicial to the appellant

can be found.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, respondent respectfully requests that this Honorable Court affirm the
conviction rendered in the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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